The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Implementation of the Principle of Checks and Balances System


  • Oleksandr M. Tupytskyi
  • Maryna S. Horodetska
  • Ninel I. Karmanova
  • Vitalii A. Vdovichen
  • Leonid Hrytsaienko


Palabras clave:

Constitutional Doctrine, Constitutional Justice, System of Checks and Balances, The Principle of Sep


The article deals with the analysis of the place and role of the Constitutional Court in the system of separation of powers, for the effective implementation of the system of checks and balances. The institutional and legal model of interaction of constitutional justice authorities with legislative and executive bodies is formulated on the basis of the comparative legal analysis of the regulatory legal acts establishing the powers of constitutional jurisdiction authorities in the mechanism of implementation of the system of checks and balances on the example of different countries with different forms of government, a number of conclusions and suggestions are provided.


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Cómo citar

M. Tupytskyi, O., S. Horodetska, M., I. Karmanova, N., A. Vdovichen, V., & Hrytsaienko, L. (2020). The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Implementation of the Principle of Checks and Balances System. Revista San Gregorio, 1(42).